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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now
threatening peace and democratic governance in Central
America, the region’s governments have decided to use the
Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal
actions, looking to improve their performance. Although
public demand for including the Armed Forces in these
functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework,
it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased
levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being
coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within
the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the
recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in
fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are
insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police
force.
Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or
consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties
traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American
region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this
topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first
we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a
decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security
duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and
implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations
within their respective societies. Third and finally,
considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper
will provide recommendations. The main findings of this
research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in
three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication
referring to the relationship between the ultimate political
authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by
implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications
not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of
armies and police but also the complementary operational
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framework within a context of comprehensive response by
the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an
environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in
citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked
by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating
in Central America. However, this participation creates an
inevitable social and political impact if implemented in
isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational
autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions
of the Armed Forces and the police as well.
Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed
Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to
security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’
governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American
States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current
crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to
confront these challenges, but with defined roles and
responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to
complement their actions.
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CALLING IN THE ARMED FORCES
Central America is a region suffering from the highest rates
of violence and criminality, particularly Guatemala with
more than 6,000 deaths annually. Guatemala, Honduras and
El Salvador are seen as the most violent countries in the socalled northern triangle (WOLA, 2009). In March 2010, the
Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, Antonio Mario Acosta, publicly stated Central
America is a region vulnerable to organized crime, as it has a
larger population of young people, a weak security and
justice system, underdevelopment and a more affordable
market for weapons (Free Press, 2010). According to United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009), in
Central America there were 29.3 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants in 2004, second only to South Africa with 31.7
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.
These statistics are the result of actions by transnational
organized crime1, which already employs methods,
organizations, weapons, logistics and personnel with military
characteristics, generating high levels of violence and
insecurity. This leads to an increase of criminal typologies 2
from the loss of power and territorial control and citizen
fatigue toward the inefficient response from the States. All
these factors affect peace and democratic governance in the
future and, if there is no change in terms of growth, it may
constitute a real threat to the very existence of the States.
The effects of crime show it has surpassed the capabilities of
law enforcement institutions foreseen by democratic States,
as the body responsible for controlling these phenomena.
1

It is considered as a new threat, concern and challenge of diverse
nature, to the security of the States of the hemisphere. For more details,
see “Declaration on the Security in the Americas.” Organization of
American States (OAS), Washington, DC. October 2003.
2
In this way, we have arms traffic and human traffic, crimes linked to
drug trafficking, terrorism, maras’ international networks (as for Mara
Salvatrucha MS-13gang) and their relation among themselves.

3

Given this reality, Central American States have recognized
the need to organize in order to deal with this problem. They
simultaneously respond by developing policies that minimize
the causes of their structural weakness. In the field of
security, they create strategies to contain and reduce the
effects of threats and violent attacks on society.
In the specific area of security, which is the subject of this
report, States should use all instruments, mechanisms and
their willingness to confront these threats and attacks, to try
to fulfill the purposes enshrined in their charter.3 Within
this context, Central American states have been forced to
allocate duties normally assigned to the police in a
democratic society, to the Armed Forces, with the goal of
strengthening their operations in the absence of viable
alternatives given the gravity of the situation.
However, although the political decision to use the military
for these roles is legally legitimate4 and motivated by the
prevailing conditions of insecurity, growing public demand
for effective responses, increasing perception of citizen
insecurity, institutional weakness of judicial and security
systems (particularly police) and a recognition of the Armed
Forces’ institutional prestige, efficiency, discipline and
severity in fulfilling their missions, these arguments, both
3

Every state is organized with the purpose of preserving peace and
security as well as to promote development but most important to
guarantee the well being of all citizens, protect their lives and integrity in
search of the supreme end which is the common good. These duties
constitute the essential goals of all States and are stated on international
documents, Constitutional charters and norms.
4
In relation to this point, in various countries of Central America, like
Guatemala and El Salvador, judicial mechanisms grant presidents the
power to call for collaboration and use the armed forces in domestic
security and public order when the civilian police forces are
overwhelmed by crime and violence. At the same time, the norm creating
the police in Nicaragua define its duties as requesting the President to
approve the support of the Nicaraguan Army in exceptional cases to
maintain or reestablish public order and citizen’s security.
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social and judicial in nature, are not enough to legitimize its
use for law enforcement.
The objection to the participation of the Armed Forces in this
regard is based on several reasons. Sometimes society rejects
this measure by arguing the military should not perform
these duties given the 1980’s peace agreements (which can
be generalized to all Central American countries), as well as
the dreadful memory of its role during the period of the
region’s internal conflicts. More importantly, it requires a
detailed analysis of the effects and implications of this type
of decision on the Armed Forces, both in relation to the
highest political authorities (political dimension) and civil
society (social dimension), and its own organizational
culture and relationship with the police (technical
dimension).
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
The participation of the Armed Forces in police duties incurs
several risks that have political implications. Some of these
implications are discussed below.
Credibility
Disproportionate response by elements of the Armed Forces,
within the framework of security support, involves the risk
of gradual deterioration of the credibility people have for
political authority and security institutions. This risk is
latent because the military has been created to neutralize and
defeat an enemy 5 using methods which, compared to the
rational use of force, due process, mediation of conflicts and
actions based on respect for civil rights, are classified as
violent and generators of abuses and human rights violations.
5

It refers to the military goal within the international law framework
limited to “establishments, constructions and positions of the armed
forces…goods that due to their nature, location and purpose, contribute
to military action; goods which destruction or capture offer a military
advantage.” Charter of Humanitarian International Law.
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights argues
that:
... The history of the hemisphere shows that the
intervention of the Armed Forces in internal security
matters in general is accompanied by violations of
human rights in violent contexts, for that reason it
should be noted that practice recommends the
avoidance of military intervention in matters of
internal security because it entails a risk of violations
of human rights (IACHR, 2009).
For example, consider a case of alleged human rights
violations by military forces under joint patrols in Mexico.
A report by the Secretariat of National Defense of Mexico
(SEDENA) released in August 2010, stresses 4,035 human
rights violations’ complaints were received from December
2006 to December 31, 2009.
A publication on Municipal Management of Public Safety in
Central America and the Dominican Republic showed
arbitrary abuses by elements of the army in the process of
"police work" with joint police patrols on roads and rural
areas as part of the Joint Task Force Group (GFTC) plan,
have taken place in Guatemala (FLACSO, DEMUCA
Foundation, 2010).
Corruption and Co-optation
Despite preparation, effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling
their duty, the Armed Forces are vulnerable to co-optation
and corruption by organized crime. The analysis of cases
that have taken place in Latin America (Colombia,
Guatemala, Mexico) reveals the military can be co-opted by
criminal gangs to commit crimes, that it could benefit from
information obtained from the police or allow criminal acts
in sectors or geographical locations to which they are
assigned.
They are also vulnerable to participate in
6

distribution and handling of drugs, drug trafficking
prostitution and human trafficking.
For example, two Guatemalan Army lieutenants were
captured at El Salvador’s International Airport in June 2010
when they tried to transport 77 capsules of heroin to the
United States in a special compartment inside the sole of a
military boot (El Periódico, 2010). Another example was
the capture of a lieutenant charged in the case of the theft of
43 rifles from the army on August 19, 2009 (El Periódico,
2010b).
Political Authority Abdicating its Responsibilities
There is a danger that politicians might abdicate from their
role of carrying out public policy and guiding the strategic
and operational actions of the State, thereby transferring
responsibility to the military. It will just result in developing
a military autonomy to solve security problems (as has
happened in the past within the context of counterinsurgency
and the resulting human rights violations), which led
political authority to abdicate its responsibility to control the
actions of the troops. In several Latin American countries,
numerous investigation and prosecution cases of those
responsible for human rights violations took place after the
end of the domestic armed conflicts under pressure from
international organizations of the Inter-American System for
the Protection of Human Rights.
Diminishing Support for Strengthening the Police Force
There is also the risk the organizational growth momentum
of the Armed Forces will take place at the expense of the
process of strengthening the police force. Although Central
American countries are going through a process of
democratic consolidation, strengthening the police requires
medium and long term efforts (to readapt regulations,
support strategic planning in line with regional threats,
strengthen human resources, and provide adequate resources
and equipment, etc.). These processes, which are often slow,
7

do not ensure an impact on public opinion or a decrease in
violence or crime rates in the short term, particularly in areas
affected by threats that require operational action exceeding
these institutions’ current capacity.
In most cases where the military has been called for law
enforcement activities, the Executive is relying on the
credibility enjoyed by the Armed Forces and calling them to
conduct joint patrols in dangerous or “red” areas. The goal
is to project a legitimate interest not only to improve security
by increasing the number of people assigned to provide it,
but also to project the State’s "strength" in combating and
preventing crime and also, in conducting police
investigations.
Yet, the decision to assign police responsibilities to the
Armed Forces also implies giving special attention to the
military institution, including providing equipment or
resources it does not possess, since its scope of action is
external security. This translates into allocating increased
financial resources to meet the needs of the military’s
operational capacity, at the expense of strengthening the law
enforcement institutions.
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
Calling the military in to conduct law enforcement activities
within the country also has social implications. Some of
them are discussed below.
Validation of Authoritarianism
These activities reinforce the opinion of those sectors of the
population that prefer authoritarian methods, harsher actions
and who view armies as "saviors of the nation." Historically,
authoritarianism has had an important social impact linked to
the creation, strengthening and reproduction of ideas
legitimizing military action as the best solution to problems
of a diverse nature which cannot be solved by the State.
8

Due in part to the rise of outward signs of violence,
delinquency and crime that go hand in hand with the poor
results achieved by the institutions of the judicial system,
particularly the perception of the work undertaken by police,
society demands more security as well as methods perceived
as more radical, to contain and combat delinquency and
crime. In this regard, it demands the presence of the Armed
Forces in public security because they are perceived as
efficient in the fulfillment of their mission.
Delegitimization of the State’s Capacity to Respond
Given the hypothetical overflow of the capabilities of joint
forces, the recurring arbitrariness of the Armed Forces and
their involvement in crime and corruption, there is a risk of
losing credibility in the State’s capacity to respond; followed
by a disappointment in democratic methods to address these
challenges. Similarly, the institutional framework, as well as
military and police forces, could be compromised and
delegitimized, generating favorable conditions for poor
governance, systematic violations of the rule of law and
latent risk of anarchy.
In this scenario, citizens could perform on their own security
actions normally assigned to the police due to lack of
credibility. This can also lead to a strengthening of measures
of authoritarianism, abuse or social control by individuals or
communities, an outright rejection of the presence of security
institutions, increases in cases of social cleansing and
killings, among other effects. These actions could create
conditions that compromise the rule of law.
TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS
The involvement of the Armed Forces in functions reserved
for the police also has technical implications, as discussed
below.

9

Reinforcing the concept of "Saviors of the homeland"
When military personnel perceive to have been called to face
a "threat to the homeland," they understand the State uses
this measure because it urgently requires its institutional
nature, methods, means and actions, for what they have been
trained, -- to "destroy," "kill" or "eliminate" whatever
threatens the country's existence.
In this regard, the Armed Forces claim a “protector role” in
the destiny of the nation, a pre-eminence with different
prerogatives from those of common citizens and
extraordinary freedom and authority to implement their
methodology for which they believe civilians are
unprepared. The Armed Forces seek to be allowed to have
direct participation in operational and strategic political
decisions that will guarantee they "save the nation" in danger
of extinction, becoming the National Goal that overrides any
other consideration (which becomes a secondary issue) and
that can only be achieved with the military leadership in
situations where civilians have already failed.
If not controlled from the start with effective measures, this
self-perception of the military in view of a challenge to "save
the country" can become a new "wave of militarism" in
response to aggression and violence from organized crime
and drug trafficking.
Military Autonomy
There is the potential for ongoing quests to achieve
operational autonomy in military actions, especially when
their effectiveness in the fulfillment of their new missions
depends on the degree of cohesion to complement the police
forces, which is quite complicated, as the police forces do
not have the same methodology and ways of acting. In the
absence of common processes and procedures guiding
frameworks of action between the police and military,
decision making is carried out with greater discretion in the
execution of tasks, with the danger of overreacting because
10

of indoctrination and methods of action by military
personnel.
Re-adjustment of the Armed Forces
Once the military personnel has been in charge of law
enforcement tasks for a prolonged period of time, it will
inevitably result in planning, adaptation of doctrine,
organization, training and logistics of participants, other than
the usual institutional response within a democratic society,
as described below.


Education: The Armed Forces need to train and
prepare personnel to meet these new roles, especially
on issues related to the conceptual framework,
procedures and methods, coordinated planning, work
organization (including shift work) and logistics. It
also implies a clear acceptance of the subordination
to political authority responsible for leading the
response of the State.

For the police force, this means having the capacity for
planning, management and leadership in making operational
decisions to improve the State’s response. In many countries
of the region, the police do not reach the same professional
status as the military. For example, in Guatemala there is no
Training School of the National Police with professional
university equivalence like in the case of the Polytechnic
School which trains army officers. However, there is already
a process, designed for 2020, that aims to solve this issue but
also to achieve a National Civil Police (PNC, for its acronym
in Spanish), which could respond to challenges posed by
crime and violence in the region.


Standardized concepts and methods: The
framework of operational complementation (police
role-military role) entails standardized concepts and
methodologies of strategic planning and action with
the goal of making both forces speak the same
11



language as they work together. It implies working
on inter-institutional planning defining the mission,
roles, duties, and deadlines in agreement with the
national security plan, and entails preventing
scenarios of action and praxis with an ideal reaction
of these forces to emerging situations, while
respecting human rights.
State’s Comprehensive Response: In the context of
the State’s comprehensive response, it involves
implementing and/or strengthening a system of
national control as well as an efficient system of
justice, governing the military and police forces, to
avoid the repetition of historical errors in relation to
human rights violations during the period of
counterinsurgency operations.

CONCLUSION
The environment has become conducive for States to use
their militaries to address security threats, mainly criminal
structures with military-style features, which are already
undermining democratic governance and threatening its very
existence. In the Central American context, the assignment
of police functions to the Armed Forces creates an inevitable
social and political impact, with especially dreadful
memories of the eras of domestic armed conflict, but also
affects the relations of the military with the government and
inside their own institutions.
The involvement of the military in police work, either
implementing it in isolated cases or giving prominence and
operational autonomy in developing its new missions, will
lead to consequences such as an increasing political
leadership, denaturalization of its main functions, and
hindering the strengthening of the police forces.
Regarding a social dimension, the involvement of the
military in police work generates mixed public opinions
12

about their participation and outcomes, but also reinforces
the idea that armies are "saviors of the nation" as they are
considered to be the only institution able to implement
authoritarian and extremely harsh measures to restore order
and security.
There is a possibility of developing a negative perception
and lack of legitimacy for the entire institutional security
framework of Central American States which are unable to
contain insecurity, despite measures implemented, which
could lead people to take the law into their own hands or to
create conditions of real lack of governance.
The army leadership has an internal institutional impact that
could lead them to become engaged in corruption, including
co-optation by organized crime and committing human rights
abuses and outrages committed in the development of these
new features. Additionally, it will involve organizational
reforms to adapt these forces in terms of education, training,
logistics and operational methods to meet new missions.
FINAL CONSIDERATION
Regardless of the constitutional framework, legal norms and
other mechanisms covering political decisions to employ
Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to police, these
should be more closely scrutinized taking into account the
threat to be faced and in particular the impact on governance
of the State and its capacity for action and maneuverability
against criminal structures. This situation will enable States
to decide more objectively and precisely what, when and
where to use the Armed Forces in public security in order to
optimize their responses, minimize implications described,
sustain the legitimacy of the decision to society and at the
same time, embark on a real process of strengthening the
police forces.

13

In this context, it is necessary to define the roles and
responsibilities for action in the field of security and
complementation between the two forces, according to the
Framework Treaty on Democratic Security (TMSD) and the
strategic guidelines emanating from the highest operational
political authority of the State. Thus, the response of the
States shall allow strategic and operational actions to
respond to national objectives with clear mechanisms of
political command and control, coordination, communication
and complementation between the actors involved at the
implementation level.
In this line of thought, the Armed Forces should prioritize
and address threats in the field of their expertise (border
control and protection), while serving in a supportcooperation capacity to the police force within the national
territory, as they achieve quality standards required by police
forces. This implies that border control and security is taken
by the Armed Forces as an assigned mission, affecting its
current deployment with a comprehensive strategy for
coordinated action with the police, which defines political
control, clear goals and tasks; respecting the functions of
civil customs authorities established by the country's legal
system.
In the framework of support to police forces, actions must be
developed under the leadership and guidance from the
political authority and led by police personnel with excellent
training and professional experience, capable of making
decisions in situations that inevitably arise in confrontation
with delinquents and criminals. Therefore, the militaries of
these States should recognize the full authority of their Home
Offices or Ministries of Interior.
To this end, it is necessary to standardize the methodological
concepts of strategic operations and operating procedures to
facilitate joint action between political authorities, police and
military, with the purpose of achieving effectiveness in
14

fulfilling the tasks to be assigned in accordance with the
national security plan. This is intended to promote and
strengthen both a control system and system of justice to
avoid a violent response from government forces and
repeated violation of human rights as happened during the
period of counterinsurgency (1960-1996).
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